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I. Introduction 
The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation1 (NAAEC), negotiated by Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States in the early 1990’s as part of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 discussions, has been called a 
“unique, highly innovative agreement....”3  The institution it 
 
† David L. Markell, Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of 
Law.   Professors John Knox, Kal Raustiala, Robert Glicksman, and Dan Tarlock, and 
Geoff Garver of the CEC, provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.   
Sarah Lindquist, FSU College of Law ’06, provided excellent research assistance.   
Although the author previously served as Director of the CEC’s Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters Unit and also as a consultant to the CEC, the views expressed here 
are entirely his own and should not be attributed to the CEC, including its Secretariat.   
This Article is an updated and expanded version of David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen 
Submissions Process: On or Off Course, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN 
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, (David L. Markell & John H. Knox 
eds., 2003).  Reprinted with permission of the publisher, http://www.sup.org. 
 1 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, art. 
8-19, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). 
 2 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 
I.L.M. 289.    For a more in-depth review of the history of the negotiations, see NAFTA 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995); PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ 
BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE 
NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996). 
 3 TEN-YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM’N., COMM’N. FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, 
TEN YEARS OF NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 4 (2004). 
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spawned, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), 
has been termed a “brave experiment in institution-building.”4  
Among other things, the CEC: (1) is the “first international 
organization created to address the environmental aspects of 
economic integration;” (2) has “innovative tools and almost 
unlimited jurisdiction to address regional environmental 
problems;” and, (3) “provides unprecedented opportunities for 
participation by civil society at the international level.”5 
The citizen submissions process that Articles 14 and 15 of the 
NAAEC establish is a critical part of the CEC.  The 
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has characterized the process 
as “[b]y far the most innovative and substantial mechanism 
created within the NAAEC for fostering transparency and public 
participation....”6  The process, described in more detail below,7 
allows citizens to direct a spotlight on domestic government 
enforcement practices in order to promote enhanced enforcement 
and, ultimately, improved environmental protection.8  As 
Professor Kal Raustiala has pointed out, the process gives citizens 
an unusually prominent role in international governance because it 
serves as a “fire alarm” type of “review institution;” it allows 
citizens to initiate claims concerning assertedly ineffective state 
performance.9  The process is a variation of what Professor Cass 
Sunstein has referred to as “informational regulation”— that is, 
regulation intended to promote effective implementation through 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 2 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter GREENING 
NAFTA]. 
 6 ENVTL. L. INST., RESEARCH REPORT: ISSUES RELATING TO ARTS. 14 & 15 OF THE 
N. AM. AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 4 (2003). 
 7 See infra Part II for a description of the citizen submission process. 
 8 See David L. Markell, The Citizen Spotlight Process, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.-Apr. 
2001, at 32, 33. 
 9 Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols and Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 50 LOYOLA L. 
REV. 389, 396 (2005) (Professor Raustiala, among others, has contrasted “fire alarm” 
mechanisms with “police patrol” approaches, which empower government authorities to 
undertake such reviews).  Professor John Knox, relatedly, suggests that the CEC 
represents a significant step away from a “Westphalian world” by empowering citizens 
to monitor Parties’ obligations under the NAAEC to effectively enforce their 
environmental laws.    John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American 
Agreements on Labor and the Environment, 50 LOYOLA L. REV. 373 (2005). 
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relatively “soft,” non-coercive approaches, rather than through 
conventional “command-and-control” strategies.10  As such, it 
represents an experiment with a relatively new tool for promoting 
compliance with the environmental laws.11  Particularly because of 
the innovative features or characteristics of the citizen submissions 
process, the CEC’s implementation of the process to date provides 
fertile soil for policymakers, members of “civil society,”12 
academics, and others interested in international governance and 
environmental protection. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the citizen 
submissions process.  In doing so, it focuses specific attention on 
the issue of jurisdictional boundaries among key actors in the 
process, notably the CEC Council, the CEC Secretariat, and 
members of the public.13  The allocation of authority for the 
implementation of international regimes is obviously of 
considerable importance as we experiment with new forms of 
global governance. 
Part III reviews four Resolutions that the CEC Council has 
issued relating to the CEC’s “factual record” process.14  For a 
variety of reasons, these Resolutions are especially important 
milestones in the history of the citizen submissions process, 
 
 10 Cass R. Sunstein, Information Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins 
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-26 (1999).    See generally CLIFFORD 
RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & 
THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 59-83, 213-67 (2003) (discussing different strategies 
for promoting environmental compliance).   The focus of the CEC process, which is 
intended to be primarily on government performance, obviously differs from the focus of 
information regulation practices that are directed toward influencing regulated party 
behavior. 
 11 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE, OTA-ENV-634 130-31 (1995). 
 12 One observer suggests that “civil society” is “the ensemble of non-state 
organizations and relations that constitute associational life.” Jesse C. Ribot, 
Representation and Accountability in Decentralized Sahelian Forestry: Legal 
Instruments of Political-Administrative Control, 12 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 447, 454 n.24 
(2000).  Ann Florini defines “civil society” as “[t]he private sector and the amorphous 
third sector of non-governmental organizations” and notes that they are “becoming key 
figures in transnational governance . . . .”  ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW 
RULES FOR RUNNING A NEW WORLD 15 (2003). 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 The CEC Council is comprised of the environmental ministers of the three 
signatory Parties.   See infra Part III. 
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especially in terms of the issue of jurisdictional boundaries.15 
Part IV offers some thoughts about the possible consequences 
of these Council Resolutions for the future of the citizen 
submissions process.  It suggests that the Resolutions’ possible  
accretion of power to the CEC Council has the potential to 
undermine the credibility of the process and the interest of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in continuing to use the 
process.  Part IV also identifies some of the issues the CEC 
experience raises for regional and global governance more 
generally. 
II. The Citizen Submissions Process: An Overview and the 
Issue of Jurisdictional Boundaries Among Key Actors 
The NAAEC citizen submissions process is an international 
spotlight that is intended to shine on and, thereby, invigorate the 
domestic environmental enforcement practices of Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States.16  The expectation is that invigorated 
enforcement of the environmental laws will improve compliance 
with these laws and, thereby, engender higher levels of 
environmental protection.17 
Such a spotlight might be expected to have and, indeed, has 
had, two effects on its core constituencies.  It has created 
expectations for interested citizens and NGOs by providing a new 
international forum to engage domestic government officials and 
highlight concerns about domestic governance.18  It also has 
 
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 Markell, supra note 8, at 33. 
 17 See, e.g., North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 
1, art. 5(1).  In describing what the citizen submissions process is, it is important to 
explain what it is not.   Among other things, it is not intended to serve as a forum for 
complaining about domestic environmental governance in the arena of standard-setting.   
That is, the process is clearly confined to allegations that a government is failing to 
effectively enforce an environmental law; allegations that the laws themselves are flawed 
(e.g., because they fail to adequately serve particular environmental values) are off-limits 
for the process.   See Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) on the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (CEC, A14/SEM/98-003/03/14(1), 1998); 
David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission 
Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 553-55 (2000). 
 18 Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 
14 and 15 of the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 26 
LOYOLA L. REV. 415 (2005).   For a review of some of the reasons why this forum may 
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created apprehension on the part of the NAAEC Parties that are its 
potential targets (and creators).19 
A key issue in the operation of the NAAEC citizen 
submissions process involves the scope of the authority of each of 
the main actors: the CEC Council (comprised of the environmental 
ministers of the three Parties);20 interested citizens (“civil 
society”);21 and a Secretariat created under the NAAEC to assist in 
implementation of the citizen submissions process, among other 
responsibilities.22  It is clear that in creating the NAAEC, the 
Parties intended to retain an important role in the implementation 
of the citizen submissions process, vesting considerable power in 
the CEC Council.23  In creating the process, however, the Parties 
also assigned a substantial role to citizens of the three North 
American countries by empowering them to start the spotlighting 
process and, thereby, influence where the spotlight will shine (the 
process is launched with the filing of a citizen complaint, called a 
submission).24  In addition, the NAAEC empowers citizens to 
contribute information about the nature and effectiveness of the 
government enforcement practices at issue in particular 
submissions.25 
The NAAEC, similarly, created a Secretariat to administer the 
citizen submissions spotlighting process, and the Agreement 
vested in the CEC Secretariat considerable authority over 
administration of the process.  Under the NAAEC’s division of 
 
be of particular interest and value to NGOs, as well as some of the arguable 
shortcomings in the process, see Markell, supra note 8, at 32. 
 19 For a discussion of the pressures that led the Parties to create the process despite 
its potential to embarrass them, see Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty 
Review in NAAEC, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 5, at 256. 
 20 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1. 
 21 See supra note 12 for a discussion concerning the definition of “civil society.” 
 22 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
14, 15.   In addition to the actors referenced in the text, the Joint Public Advisory 
Committee (JPAC) plays a role in the citizen submissions process.  See John D. Wirth, 
Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 
5 at 199. 
 23 See infra Part III. 
 24 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
14. 
 25 Id. art. 15. 
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responsibilities, it is the Secretariat’s job to conduct the initial 
review of a submission and decide, based on a variety of factors 
contained in NAAEC Article 14(1) and (2), whether to reject the 
submission or to ask the targeted country for a response.26  Article 
14(2)(b), for example, directs the Secretariat to consider whether 
the submission “raises matters whose further study in [the citizen 
submissions] process would advance the goals of this 
Agreement....”27  If the Secretariat determines that a submission 
does not warrant further review, based on the Secretariat’s 
consideration of the submission in light of the Article 14(1) and 
(2) factors, the Secretariat unilaterally may dismiss the 
submission.  The Secretariat has exercised this initial review or 
filtering responsibility under Article 14(1) and (2) fairly 
rigorously: during the CEC’s first ten plus years (through February 
15, 2005), the Secretariat has either terminated or notified 
submitters of the need to revise twenty-three submissions under 
Article 14(1) or (2), out of a total of fifty submissions filed.28 
For submissions that survive the Secretariat’s Article 14(1) and 
(2) filtering process, it is the Secretariat’s responsibility both to 
request a response from the Party and to review the submission in 
light of any such response.29  The Secretariat then determines 
whether to notify the Council that, in the Secretariat’s view, it 
 
 26 For more complete summaries of the citizen submissions process, see, e.g., John 
H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The 
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 
(2001);  Markell, supra note 17. 
 27 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
14(2)(b). 
 28 Of these twenty-three submissions, sixteen were ultimately terminated because 
no revised submissions were received within thirty days after the request or the 
Secretariat determined that the revised submission still did not meet Article 14 
requirements.  In one submission – Coal-Fired Power Plants – the Secretariat has 
received a revised submission but has not determined if the revised submission meets the 
Article 14(1) requirements.   Additionally, under Guideline 3.10 the Secretariat has 
requested that the submitters of four submissions fix “minor errors” in their submissions 
before proceeding with the Article 14 analysis.  The Secretariat is currently reviewing 
submission number 50 – Crushed Gravel in Puerto Rico – for compliance with these 
Article 14 provisions.   All information regarding the procedural status of the 
submissions was found using the “Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters” link at 
the CEC website, http://www.cec.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). 
 29 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
15(1).   Thus far, the Parties uniformly have provided such responses. 
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would be appropriate under the NAAEC to prepare a “factual 
record.”30  The Secretariat may unilaterally dismiss a submission 
at this stage if it determines that a factual record is not warranted.31  
In either case (a recommendation to proceed with a factual record 
or a dismissal), the Secretariat must explain the rationale for its 
decision.32  As of February 15, 2005, the Secretariat had made 
eighteen recommendations to the Council that a factual record is 
warranted and dismissed eleven submissions after receiving a 
Party’s response.33 
The process creates specific “checks” that the Council may 
exercise at particular stages in the citizen submissions process.  
Thus, the NAAEC creates a “check” for the Council for 
submissions for which the Secretariat believes development of a 
factual record is warranted, as indicated above.  Instead of 
allowing the Secretariat to unilaterally determine to proceed with 
the preparation of a factual record, Article 15(2) of the NAAEC 
empowers the Council, after it receives the Secretariat’s 
Recommendation, to decide whether to authorize the Secretariat to 
prepare a factual record.34  A potentially important feature of this 
 
 30 Id.  Factual records are the endpoint of the citizen submission process and 
provide information about the nature of the Party’s enforcement practices at issue and 
about the effectiveness of those enforcement practices.  Id. 
 31 See id.; Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (C/99-
00/RES/07/Rev.3Council Res. 99-06), at No. 9.6 (June 28, 1999), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/99-06e_EN.pdf (“If the Secretariat considers 
that the submission, in light of any response provided by the Party, does not warrant 
development of a factual record . . . the submission process is terminated with respect to 
that submission”). 
 32 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
15(1) (recommendation to proceed with a factual record); Guidelines for Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, supra note 31. 
 33 The CEC provides the final determination of each submission in its “Citizen 
Submissions on Enforcement Matters” link on its webpage, www.cec.org.  Additionally, 
as of December 31, 2004, two submissions were withdrawn by the submitters before the 
Secretariat decided whether to recommend a factual record or dismiss the submission, 
and two submissions are pending either as a response from the government or a decision 
by the Secretariat. 
 34 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
15(2) (“The Secretariat shall prepare a factual record if the Council, by a two-thirds vote, 
instructs it to do so”) (emphasis added). 
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check is that only a two-thirds vote of the Parties is required to go 
forward with the preparation of such a record.35  Thus, the Party 
that is the focus of the submission cannot unilaterally terminate the 
process at this stage.  As of February 15, 2005, the Council has 
directed the Secretariat to develop factual records for fourteen 
submissions and has issued two Resolutions in which it rejected 
the Secretariat’s recommendation and, instead, dismissed the 
submission.36 
If the Council directs the Secretariat to go forward with the 
development of a factual record, the Secretariat has the 
opportunity and responsibility to develop information relating to 
the allegations in the submission of a failure to effectively enforce 
and then to prepare a draft factual record that contains the results 
of its investigative work.  Article 15(4) of the Agreement 
authorizes the Secretariat to consider “any relevant technical, 
scientific or other information” that is: (1) publicly available; (2) 
submitted by interested non-governmental organizations or 
persons; (3) submitted by the JPAC; or, (4) developed by the 
Secretariat or by independent experts.37  The Agreement also 
specifies that the Secretariat shall consider any information 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Council Resolution 02-13 (May 16, 2000) (Cytrar II Submission); Instruction to 
the Secretariat of the Commission of Environmental Cooperation Regarding the 
Assertion that Mexico is Failing to Effectively Enforce Its Environmental Law in 
Relation to the Establishment and Operation of Cytrar Hazardous Waste Landfill, in the 
city of Hermosillo, Senora, Mexico (Dec 10, 2002) (C/C.01/02-06/02-13/RES/Final), 
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/01-1-Res-E.pdf; Instruction to the 
Secretariat of the Commission of Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion 
that Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce Certain Environmental Protection 
Standards Regarding the Agricultural Pollution Emanating from Livestock Operations 
(SEM-97-003) (Quebec Hogs submission) (C/C.01/00-04/RES/01/Rev.03), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-3-res-e.pdf.  The Quebec Hogs submission was 
dismissed by a 2-1 vote, with the United States voting to proceed with a factual record 
and Canada and Mexico voting to dismiss, and the Cytrar II Submission was dismissed 
by a unanimous vote.    The Council, in another May 16, 2000 Resolution (Council 
Resolution #00-02), deferred consideration of the Oldman River submission (in one of 
the November 16, 2001 Resolutions discussed in more detail below, the Council voted to 
go forward with a factual record for this submission).   Decision by Council Regarding 
Submission on Enforcement Matters (May 16, 2000) (SEM-97-006) C/C.01/00-
04/RES/02, available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/00-02e_EN.pdf. 
 37 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
15(4). 
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provided by a Party.38  Another provision in the NAAEC, Article 
21, gives the Secretariat authority to obtain information from the 
Parties,39 and Article 11(4) forbids unilateral Party efforts to 
influence the Secretariat in the performance of its 
responsibilities.40 
The process creates two Party “checks” on the Secretariat’s 
authority following the Secretariat’s preparation of a draft factual 
record.  First, the NAAEC requires that the Secretariat submit 
draft factual records to the Council, and it authorizes each Party to 
provide comments to the Secretariat on the draft.41  An important 
limitation on this Party “check” is that the Agreement specifies 
that Parties’ comments must be confined to the “accuracy” of the 
draft.42  An additional limitation on this Party “check” is that the 
Agreement does not obligate the Secretariat to incorporate even 
these narrowly focused comments.  Instead, it simply requires that 
the Secretariat take such comments into account, when 
appropriate.43 
After the Secretariat considers the Parties’ comments and 
incorporates them as it deems appropriate into a final factual 
record, the Parties’ final “check” is that the Secretariat submits the 
final factual record to the Council, leaving it to the Council to 
determine whether to release it to the public (again, a two-thirds 
vote of the Council members is required to make a final factual 
record public).44  As of December 31, 2004, the Secretariat has 
submitted ten final factual records to the Council, and the Council 
in each case has unanimously approved their release.45 
This review of the citizen submissions process is intended to 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. art. 21. 
 40 Id. art 11(4). 
 41 Id. art. 15(5). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. art. 15(6). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Final Factual Records have been released for: Aquanova, BC Hydro, BC 
Logging, BC Mining, Cozumel, Metales y Derivados, Migratory Birds, Oldman River II, 
Rio Magdalena, and Molymex II.  The final Factual Records are available through the 
“Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters” link of the CEC website at 
http://www.cec.org. 
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suggest that an important feature of the process is its allocation of 
authority and responsibility among the Parties, civil society, and 
the Secretariat–its creation of “jurisdictional boundaries” that 
establish the respective parameters for action by the different 
actors in the process.46  The considerable tension and acrimony 
that this question of boundaries has spawned during the early years 
of the process is evidence of the importance that many attach to its 
resolution.47  A common theme of the NGO community and of 
scholarly commentary has been that the NAAEC’s allocation of 
authority limits the authority of the Council to some degree by 
creating an independent role for the Secretariat and an important 
role for citizens.48  Numerous NGOs and commentators have 
further suggested that the Council has fallen short in respecting 
limits on its authority and that, for the process to operate as 
intended (and for it to be credible with the members of civil 
society), the Council needs to do a better job of adhering to the 
self-imposed limits contained in the NAAEC and accord 
appropriate respect to the integral roles of the Secretariat and 
citizens in the process.49 
This issue has received the most attention in the context of the 
four Resolutions the Council issued in November 2001, in which 
the Council directed the Secretariat to prepare factual records with 
respect to four submissions.  Part III reviews these Resolutions in 
 
 46 This Article does not suggest that any particular allocation of power is 
appropriate but, instead, focuses on the nature of the allocation the Parties seemed to 
create in the NAAEC and the extent to which they have implemented this allocation.  Cf. 
CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 8 (2001). 
 47 Some early commentators anticipated these tensions.  See, e.g., FOUR-YEAR 
REVIEW OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: 
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (June 1998).  Numerous observers 
have commented on their presence.  See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger 
Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2001);  Knox, supra note 26; Raustiala, supra note 9; Christopher 
Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under 
the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 175 (2002). 
 48 See, e.g., Wold et al., supra note 18; ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 13; TEN-
YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM., supra note 3, at 45; JPAC Advice to Council, no. 01-
07, Oct. 23, 2001, JPAC Advice to Council, n. 03-05, Dec. 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.cec.org. 
 49 See supra notes 47 & 48, and the sources cited therein. 
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some detail. 
III. The Four Council Resolutions 
This Article focuses on the allocation of authority or 
jurisdictional boundaries issue in the particular context of four 
Resolutions that the CEC Council issued on November 16, 2001, 
in which the Council directed the CEC Secretariat to prepare 
factual records in connection with four citizen submissions.50  The 
Council’s issuance of these Resolutions to develop factual records 
represents an important milestone in the formative years of the 
citizen submissions process.  Through these Resolutions, the 
Council authorized preparation of more factual records than it had 
directed to be developed during the first seven years of the 
process.51  The importance of these Council actions for the 
direction and credibility of the process is magnified because 
factual records are at the heart of the citizen submissions 
spotlighting process.  They serve as its primary and most in-depth 
spotlighting mechanism. 
 
 50 See Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for the Environmental 
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that the Government of the US is Failing to 
Effectively Enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (SEM-99-002) (C/C.01/01-
06/RES/04/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-10e.pdf; Instruction to the Secretariat of 
the Commission for Environmental cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Canada Is 
Failing to Effectively Enforce Section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act (SEM-98-004) (C/C.01-
06/RES/05/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ 
COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf; Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for 
Environmental cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Canada Is Failing to Effectively 
Enforce Sections 35 (1) and 36(3) of the Fisheries Act (SEM-98-004) (C/C.01-
06/RES/02/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/ 
pdf/COUNCIL/res01-12e.pdf.   The Council actually issued five Resolutions on that 
date, but the fifth, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Mexico Is Failing to Effectively Enforce 
Provisions of Its General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection, 
Forestry Law, Mexican Official Standard NOM-)62-ECOL-1994 and NOM-059-ECOL-
1994, The Law of National Waters and Its Regulations, the Fisheries Law and Its 
Regulations and the Federal Criminal Code with Respect to the Activities of Granjas 
Aquanova (SEM-98-006) (C/C.01/01-06/RES/01/Final) (Nov. 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-09e.pdf, does not raise the issues 
addressed in this Article and will, therefore, not be discussed. 
 51 Before November 2001, the Council had authorized the preparation of only three 
factual records.  David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen Submissions Process, in GREENING 
NAFTA, supra note 5 at 274, 294 n.7 & app. 
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The Resolutions’ importance as potential indicators of the 
prospects for the citizen submissions process is heightened by the 
fact that one of the Resolutions involves the first Secretariat 
recommendation to develop a factual record involving the United 
States and, therefore, the first occasion for the Council to consider 
such a recommendation.  The United States had been the only 
Party that had not yet voted to reject a Secretariat 
recommendation, and the public and, most likely, the other Parties 
were interested in learning whether the United States’ support for 
the citizen submissions process would remain firm even when the 
spotlight would be on its own enforcement practices.  In 1994, the 
United States had issued an Executive Order in which the 
President committed to vote in favor of Secretariat 
recommendations except in extremely limited circumstances.52  
The recommendation focusing on U.S. enforcement practices 
arguably put this Order to a stricter test than the recommendations 
that had preceded it. 
At a superficial level, the Resolutions suggest a congruity of 
views among Council, Secretariat, and submitters about factual 
records.  In each Resolution, the Council agreed with the 
Secretariat’s recommendation, and the submission itself, that a 
factual record should be developed.53  But, this superficial 
congruity of views disappears upon closer examination of the 
Resolutions.  A wide chasm becomes evident. 
The four Council Resolutions dramatically changed the focus 
of the factual records that the submitters requested and that the 
Secretariat recommended by substantially limiting or redefining 
the scope of the factual records to be developed.  While the 
submitters asserted that broad, programmatic failures to effectively 
 
 52 “To the greatest extent practicable, pursuant to Articles 15(1) and 15(2), where 
the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (“Secretariat”) 
informs the Council that a factual record is warranted, the United States shall support the 
presentation of such factual record.” Exec. Order No. 12915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25775 (May 
18, 1994). 
 53 See Oldman River, Council Res. 01-08 (2001), available at http:// 
www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf; Migratory Birds, Council Res. 01-10 
(2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res-01-10e.pdf; B.C. 
Mining, Council Res. 01-11 (2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ 
COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf; B.C. Logging, Council Res. 01-12 (2001), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res01-12e.pdf. 
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enforce particular environmental laws existed,54 and while the 
Secretariat recommended that these asserted widespread failures to 
effectively enforce be investigated through development of factual 
records,55 the Council Resolutions declined to direct the Secretariat 
to develop factual records on such broad, programmatic alleged 
failures to effectively enforce.  Instead, the Resolutions directed 
the Secretariat to develop factual records concerning some of the 
isolated examples of asserted failures to effectively enforce that 
the submitters had included as illustrations of the broader 
failures.56 
 
 54 See ALLIANCE FOR THE WORLD ROCKIES ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 14 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN 
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 11-12 (CEC, A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB, 
1999) (suggesting that the U. S. failure to enforce the Migratory Bird Act was 
nationwide in scope), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf; 
SIERRA CLUB OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA’S FAILURE TO 
ENFORCE THE FISHERIES ACT AGAINST MINING COMPANIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: A 
SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION PURSUANT TO 
ARTICLE 14 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 6, 
12-13 (1998) (asserting ineffective Canadian enforcement of the Fisheries Act against 
mining operations, on a widespread basis), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-SUB-E.pdf; DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION ET AL., 
SUBMISSION PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 12-13 (2000) (similarly asserting a broad-based 
Canadian failure to effectively enforce the Fisheries Act, in this case against the logging 
industry), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/00-4-SUB-E.pdf.; THE FRIENDS 
OF THE OLDMAN RIVER, NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION ARTICLE 14 SUBMISSION (1997) (alleging a widespread failure to 
effectively enforce the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-SUB-E.pdf. 
 55 See SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF 
NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 15(1) NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A 
FACTUAL RECORD IS WARRANTED (2001) (B.C. Logging), available at http://www. 
cec.org/files/pdf/sem/00-4-ADV-E.PDF; SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 15(1) NOTIFICATION TO 
COUNCIL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS WARRANTED (2001) (B.C. 
Mining), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-ADV-E.PDF; SECRETARIAT 
OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 
15(1) NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS 
WARRANTED (2001) (Migratory Birds), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ 
sem/99-2-ADV-E.PDF; SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ARTICLE 15(1) NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT 
DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS WARRANTED (1999) (Oldman River), available 
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-ADV-E.PDF. 
 56 See supra note 53. 
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The Migratory Birds submission is a good example.57  The 
Secretariat recommended that a factual record be prepared 
concerning the alleged failure of the United States to enforce the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) on a nationwide basis.58  The 
Secretariat’s recommendation provided no indication at all that the 
Secretariat thought that it would be useful to develop a factual 
record limited to two isolated instances of alleged failures to 
effectively enforce the MBTA, as the Council ultimately directed 
in its Resolution.59  The submitters devoted a single paragraph to 
these two instances in their submission,60 the United States did not 
even mention the two alleged examples in its response,61 and the 
Secretariat devoted little attention to them in its recommendation.62  
Further, the questions highlighted in the Secretariat’s 
recommendation as warranting in-depth review in a factual record 
focused almost entirely on the broad alleged failure to enforce the 
MBTA effectively.  For example, it recommended a review of the 
overall numbers of migratory birds killed in logging operations 
(operations for which the United States conceded it does not 
enforce the MBTA), compared to the numbers killed through 
activities for which the United States does take enforcement 
action.63 
Thus, by directing the Secretariat to develop a factual record 
that focuses on two isolated instances of asserted failures to 
effectively enforce, the Council may well have directed the 
Secretariat to prepare a factual record even though the Secretariat 
itself would have determined that a factual record that focused 
only on these isolated incidents was not warranted.64  Many of the 
 
 57 See Migratory Birds Submission (CEC, A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB, 1999), 
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf. 
 58 See Migratory Birds Recommendation (CEC, A14/SEM/99-002/11/AVD), 
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA30.pdf. 
 59 See supra notes 57 & 58. 
 60 See supra note 57. 
 61 Migratory Birds Party Response (CEC, A14/SEM/99-002/04/RSP), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF1842.PDF 
 62 See supra note 58. 
 63  Id. 
 64 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.   A related question, not addressed 
in detail here, is how much the Council may depart from a submission in 
directing the preparation of a factual record.  The submitters for the four 
2005] GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 773 
 
issues that the submission raised, which the Secretariat believed 
warranted development of a factual record, may be beyond the 
scope of the Council Resolution.65  One of the lawyers for the 
submitters has stated specifically that the submitters would not 
have gone forward on this basis.66 
A February 2002 memorandum from the Director of the CEC 
Secretariat’s Submissions Unit to the Chair of the Joint Public 
Advisory Committee (JPAC) acknowledged the limiting effect of 
the Resolutions: 
[T]he Council included instructions [in the four Resolutions] to 
prepare factual records regarding specific cases raised in the 
submissions, but did not include instructions regarding 
allegations in each of those submissions of widespread failures 
to effectively enforce environmental laws.  For each of those 
four submissions, the Secretariat had recommended preparing 
factual records in regard to the widespread allegations of failures 
to effectively enforce.
67
 
The CEC’s final Factual Record for each of the submissions 
echoes the conclusion that the Council Resolutions dramatically 
narrowed the scope of broad “pattern-type” submissions by 
authorizing factual records focused on isolated instances of alleged 
ineffectual enforcement.  Each Factual Record contains the 
following language: “In light of this instruction [from the Council, 
in the Resolution authorizing the preparation of a Factual Record], 
the scope of this factual record is different from the scope in the 
submission and the factual record that the Secretariat considered to 
warrant development in its Article 15(1) notification.”68 
 
submissions discussed in the text uniformly opposed the Council’s decision to 
narrow the factual records.  See, e.g., Letter from Sierra Legal Defense Fund to 
Joint Public Advisory Committee (Sept. 8, 2003), reprinted in ENVTL. L. INST., 
supra note 6;  see also WOLD ET AL., INT’L. ENVTL. L. PROJECT, COMMENTS ON 
ISSUES RELATING TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 3-7 (Oct. 2, 2003), reprinted in ENVTL. L. 
INST, supra note 6. 
 65 See supra note 63, and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 72-74, and accompanying text. 
 67 Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Director of Submissions on Enforcement 
Matters Unit, to Jon Plaut, Chair of Joint Public Advisory Committee (Feb. 15, 2002), 
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/SEM/Memo-Garver-e.pdf. 
 68 See Factual Record: BC Mining Submission (SEM-98-004), at 17, available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-FFR_en.pdf; Factual Record: BC Logging 
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In its 2003 report, ELI similarly concludes that in each of the 
four Resolutions, the Council significantly limited the scope of the 
factual records that the Secretariat was to prepare, compared to the 
scope requested in the submissions and recommended in the 
Secretariat Recommendations: 
In each of these [BC Mining, BC Logging, Migratory Birds, and 
Oldman River II] cases, the Secretariat recommended to the 
Council that a factual record be developed to investigate alleged 
widespread, systematic failures of a Party to effectively enforce 
its environmental law.  Although the Council approved the 
preparation of factual records with respect to each of these 
submissions, it significantly narrowed the scope of the 
investigation.  That is, rather than order preparation of factual 
records on the alleged widespread failure to effectively enforce, 
it instructed the Secretariat to develop factual records 
concerning only specific examples of the alleged widespread 
failure that were detailed in the submission.  This represented 
the first time the CEC Council had used its approval authority 
under the NAAEC to narrow the substantive scope of the factual 
records.
69
 
 
Submission (SEM-00-004), at 21, available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/00-4-
FFR_en.pdf; Final Factual Record: Migratory Birds Submission (SEM 99-002), at 18, 
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/MigratoryBirds-FFR_EN.pdf; Factual 
Record: Oldman River II Submission (SEM 97-006), at 17, available at http://www.cec. 
org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-FFR_en.pdf.   The submitters registered the same criticisms 
concerning the narrowing of the scope of the Factual Records.  See, e.g., infra notes 70-
75.   The submitter of the Oldman River II Submission, Martha Kostuch, echoed the 
CEC’s description of the Council Resolution as a significant modification of the type of 
factual record sought by the submitters and recommended by the Secretariat: 
The Secretariat [in its Recommendation] also understood that [Friends of the 
Oldman River’s] submission dealt with the general failure of the Government of 
Canada to enforce the Fisheries Act and CEAA and not a specific case.  FOR’s 
submission alleges a general failure to enforce the Fisheries Act and CEAA, not 
a failure in relation to any specific case. 
COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, WRITTEN COMMENTS ON THE PUBLIC HISTORY OF 
SUBMISSIONS MADE UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (Nov. 14, 2000). 
 69 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6.   For summaries of the ways in which the Council 
Resolutions narrowed the scope of the Submissions and Recommendations, see id. at 5-
8; see also Markell, supra note 51, at 277-80.  The TRAC similarly notes that the 
Council has “adopted a series of measures over the years to narrow the process’s scope” 
and cites specifically to “disallowing examination of allegations of a broad pattern of 
ineffective enforcement in several factual records” and “limiting the scope of factual 
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The Council’s Resolutions have at least three important 
implications for the factual record process and for the division of 
authority for its implementation.  First, the practical reality of the 
Council Resolutions is that by authorizing factual records that are 
limited to specific alleged failures to effectively enforce, the 
Council dramatically changed the types of alleged enforcement 
failures to be addressed in the factual records.  ELI makes the 
point that the Council’s narrowing of the scope of the factual 
records dramatically changed the nature of the Factual Records the 
Secretariat was able to develop for the four submissions for which 
the Council issued its November 2001 Resolutions by excluding 
various issues from the Secretariat’s consideration.  ELI states: 
[T]he submissions were largely prompted by the concerns about 
broad enforcement issues–such as the allocation of staff and 
resources for enforcement, use and effectiveness of compliance 
assistance programs, use and effectiveness of traditional 
enforcement tools, and policies regarding when state or 
provincial enforcement action may preclude federal 
enforcement.  Although the Secretariat... identified these issues 
as “central questions” in its determinations, it is precisely these 
issues that have been excluded by the Council from the scope of 
the factual record[s].
70
 
A second important aspect of the Council’s actions in its 
Resolutions is that it is by no means clear for any of the 
submissions that the Secretariat would have recommended a 
factual record if the submission only involved the isolated 
examples for which the Council authorized development of factual 
records.  It appears undisputed at this point that the Council 
limited the scope of the factual records the Secretariat 
recommended be prepared and that the submitters in each case had 
sought.  It is unclear whether the Secretariat would have 
 
records . . . .”     TEN-YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3.  The TRAC also 
notes that “JPAC, the NACs, US GAC, academics, independent observers and NGOs 
have widely and repeatedly criticized the Council for these actions.”   Id. 
 70 ENVTL. L. INST. supra note 6, at 10.  As ELI notes, the submitters held the view 
that the Council Resolutions limited the scope of the factual records and, accordingly, 
significantly limited their value.  Id.  ELI put it a bit more strongly: “Submitters have 
openly and vociferously expressed frustration that the factual records do not adequately 
address the concerns that prompted their submission.”  Id.; see also Wold et al., supra 
note 18, at 427-29. 
776 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 30 
 
recommended development of factual records of such limited 
scope.  The Factual Records themselves make this clear.  Each 
Factual Record provides that: 
It should not be assumed that the Secretariat’s Article 15(1) 
Notification to Council recommending a factual record for [X] 
was intended to include a recommendation to prepare a factual 
record of the scope set out in Council Resolution [X], or that the 
Secretariat would have recommended a factual record of this 
scope.
71
 
Thus, there is a possibility that the Resolutions may require the 
Secretariat to develop factual records on matters for which the 
Secretariat believes a factual record is not warranted or is 
warranted only if part of a larger inquiry. 
Finally, the limitations on the scope of the factual record that 
the Council imposed in each of the four Resolutions create a 
distinct possibility that the Council directed the development of 
factual records for asserted failures to effectively enforce that the 
submitters themselves would not have considered worth pursuing 
through the CEC process.  In other words, the submitters would 
not have filed submissions that raised such asserted failures to 
effectively enforce except as part of more broad-based 
submissions that targeted, in the submitters’ views, more 
significant government enforcement failures.  Indeed, a lawyer for 
the submitters of one of the four submissions addressed in the 
November Council 2001 Resolutions has made precisely this 
claim.  Chris Wold, an attorney for the submitters of the Migratory 
Birds submission, states in a recent article that: 
Without question, the submitters would never have prepared 
Migratory Birds if they had known that the Council would, in an 
arbitrary and capricious fashion, limit the record to two specific 
instances cited only as examples of widespread government 
enforcement.  The Migratory Birds submitters found the Citizen 
Submissions Process attractive only because of its capacity to 
investigate the United States’ broad pattern of non-enforcement 
of the MBTA.
72
 
 
 71 See the sources cited supra note 68. 
 72 Wold et al., supra note 18, at 426.   See also Wold et al., supra note 64, at 9 (“By 
modifying the scope of factual records and attempting to limit the kind of information 
the Secretariat can consider, Council is calling for the preparation of factual records that 
no one (except Council) wants.  Surely the Citizen Submission Process was not designed 
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Wold describes the Council’s Resolution concerning the 
Migratory Birds submission as “direct[ing] the Secretariat to 
develop a factual record... that resembled neither the issues 
presented by the submitters nor those recommended for study by 
the Secretariat.”73  His colorful characterization is that, for the 
Migratory Birds submission, the Factual Record “is the factual 
record that nobody wanted.”74  Randy Christensen, an attorney for 
the submitters in the B.C. Mining and B.C. Logging submissions 
has raised this issue as well, though not as directly.75 
The “question of law” that the Council Resolutions raise 
involves whether the Council has the legal authority to issue 
Resolutions that: (1) dramatically change the focus of the factual 
records that the submitters proposed or the Secretariat 
recommended; (2) direct the preparation of factual records on 
matters for which the Secretariat may believe a factual record is 
not warranted or is warranted only if part of a larger inquiry; and 
(3) direct the preparation of factual records on matters for which 
the submitters appear to believe a factual record is not warranted 
or is warranted only if part of a larger inquiry.  What conclusions 
may be drawn about the legitimacy of the Resolutions in light of 
the jurisdictional boundaries the NAAEC has established to 
demarcate the parameters for action by each of these actors?  Are 
the Council’s actions in issuing the four November 2001 
Resolutions consistent with the NAAEC’s jurisdictional 
boundaries, or do these actions involve inappropriate Council 
encroachment onto the terrain reserved for citizen submitters and 
the Secretariat?76 
 
to achieve this absurd outcome.”) 
 73 Id.  at 427. 
 74 Id.; see also WOLD ET AL., supra note 64 at 5. 
 75 See, e.g., Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, Sierra Legal Defense 
Fund, to Joint Public Advisory Committee 5 (Sept. 8, 2003), reprinted in ENVTL. L. 
INST., supra note 6, app. (noting that “the effect of the Council resolution [on the B.C. 
Logging submission] was to direct the Secretariat’s attention away from the concerns of 
the submitters, and, we believe, the concerns of greatest environmental significance”). 
 76 The Resolutions raise other concerns not addressed in this article.  Perhaps of 
greatest importance, the Resolutions potentially signal the Council’s view that the citizen 
submissions process should be confined to allegations of specific instances of failures to 
effectively enforce and exclude allegations of widespread failures to effectively enforce.  
Because in many situations widespread failures seem particularly suited to attention on a 
regional stage, a move to limit the process in this way would be unfortunate from a 
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The Council appears to have taken the position that its 
retention of ultimate authority to oversee the NAAEC 
encompasses the authority to make decisions about any issue 
relating to implementation of the Agreement.77  In Resolution 00-
09, for example, the Council noted that “countries that are parties 
to international agreements are solely competent to interpret such 
instruments.”78  More specifically, at least one high-ranking 
Canadian official appears to hold the view that the NAAEC “is 
very clear that the Council is the ultimate authority for 
determining the scope of a Factual Record....”79 
By contrast, other commentators have asserted that the text of 
 
public policy standpoint.  There also is a strong argument that such a limitation would 
represent an inappropriate limitation in the coverage of the process.  The Secretariat’s 
recommendation concerning the Migratory Birds submission raises this issue, and there 
have been several criticisms of the Resolutions on the ground that they inappropriately 
narrow the scope of the process.  See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v (noting 
that: 
By defining the scope of the Secretariat’s investigations in each of the four 
factual records examined, the Council jeopardized the ability of those records to 
fully expose the controversy at issue.   Specifically, the Factual records were not 
able to address evidence of widespread enforcement failures, cumulative effects 
that stem from such widespread patterns, or the broader concerns of submitters 
about implementation of Enforcement policies); 
Environmental Policy Alert, EPA Backs Narrow NAFTA Inquiry to Resolve 
Environmental Dispute (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://www.InsideEPA.com; Environmental 
Policy Alert, Parties Vote to Limit NAFTA Environmental Citizens’ Suit Process (Nov. 
28, 2001), available at http://www.InsideEPA.com.  Similarly, ELI suggests that the 
Council’s Resolutions “appear to require submitters to allege specific violations in order 
to support the development of a factual record,” and ELI notes that this is likely to be 
“burdensome” to submitters.   ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v, 13 (noting that 
narrowing the scope of the factual record will require submitters to “detail every specific 
violation to be included in the Secretariat’s investigation”).  A third concern is that the 
Resolutions are less transparent than they should be because of the limited Council 
explanation of why it rejected the Secretariat’s recommendations that broad-based 
factual records be developed, and instead opted for narrowly-focused factual records.   
See supra note 50.  Fourth, the Council’s decision to direct the Secretariat to prepare and 
share work plans for the factual records, and to allow comment on them, also raises 
questions about the appropriate allocation of responsibility to administer the factual 
record process.   ENVTL. L.  INST., supra note 6, at v. 
 77 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15, n. 120. 
 78 Article 10(1)(c) and (d) authorizes the Council to “oversee the Secretariat” and 
to “address questions and differences that may arise between the Parties regarding the 
interpretation of [the] Agreement.” 
 79 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15, n. 120. 
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the NAAEC evinces an intent on the part of the Parties only to 
reserve certain powers to administer the citizen submissions 
process and an intent to assign certain powers to citizens and to the 
Secretariat.  These commentators raise the possibility that the 
Council’s actions in the form of the four Resolutions may be, or 
are, beyond its authority under the NAAEC.  For example, in its 
2003 study, ELI concluded that the Council’s narrowing of the 
scope of factual records “appears to violate the spirit and purpose 
of the Agreement.”80  ELI continues that “[t]he Council’s 
resolutions, in interfering with the Secretariat’s fact-finding 
process by deciding where to shine the spotlight, undermine the 
independence of the Secretariat and the ability of the process to 
enhance transparent and accountable environmental governance 
practices.”81Attorneys for various submitters have reached the 
same conclusion.  Chris Wold, for example, one of the lawyers for 
the U.S. submitters in the Migratory Birds submission,82 has 
argued that the Council Resolutions “den[y] the Secretariat its 
proper role established by the CEC.”83  Randy Christensen, one of 
the lead attorneys for the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (SLDF), 
similarly has stated that the Resolutions “contradict the spirit and 
intent of the NAAEC.”84  These observers of and participants in 
the process argue that the Parties intended to give the Secretariat a 
significant degree of independence and to delegate to it authority 
for certain decisions, that the Parties have given submitters certain 
powers as well,85 and that the Resolutions inappropriately 
 
 80 Id. at 14. 
 81 Id. at 16. 
 82 ALLIANCE FOR THE WORLD ROCKIES ET AL., supra note 54, at 11-12 (identifying 
Chris Wold as one of the attorneys and law clerks who prepared the submission). 
 83 Wold et al., supra note 18, at 426. 
 84 Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, supra note 75, at 3.  SLDF’s 
lawyers have served as legal counsel for submitters in at least five submissions to date: 
BC Hydro, BC Mining, BC Logging, Pulp and Paper, and Ontario Logging.  Id. at 1.  As 
noted above, two of the four November 2001 Council Resolutions (BC Mining and BC 
Logging) addressed submissions for which SLDF served as legal counsel. 
 85 See Id. (“[T]he Secretariat must . . . have . . . the independence to exercise its 
best professional judgment with respect to Submissions, the adequacy of Party 
responses, recommendations to Council and development of factual records”) (citing 
JPAC report); TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45 (noting 
that “[t]he NAAEC gives the Secretariat a central role to play in the administration of the 
process”).  Wold et al., supra note 18, at 426 (“The NAAEC . . . grant[s] the Council and 
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encroach on the roles the NAAEC cedes to these other key 
participants in the citizen submissions process.86 
Without purporting to resolve this issue definitively, it seems 
indisputable that, at this juncture at least, three years after the 
issuance of the Resolutions, there is considerable skepticism, 
particularly in the NGO community, concerning the legality and 
legitimacy of the Council’s Resolutions.  The final Part of this 
Article considers some of the possible ramifications of this 
skepticism. 
IV. Observations and Conclusions 
Conceptually, the structure of the citizen submissions process 
 
Secretariat distinct roles and clear boundaries.”). 
 86 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15-16.  This author previously raised the 
question of whether the Council’s actions were entirely within its authority under the 
NAAEC.   See Markell, supra note 51, at 208-85.  Given the space limitations of that 
chapter, the author’s purpose was to highlight that the Resolutions raised this issue, 
which the author viewed to be an important one for the future of the citizen submissions 
process, and to leave a comprehensive analysis or definitive conclusion for a different 
forum.    See id. at 285.   The author did, however, suggest that the NAAEC does not 
allow the Council to act sua sponte to direct the Secretariat to develop a factual record 
about an enforcement policy or practice of the Council’s own choosing: 
The limited conclusion offered here is that the Council lacks the authority under 
the NAAEC to act sua sponte to direct the Secretariat to develop a factual 
record.  The Council does not have the authority, for example, to direct the 
Secretariat to prepare a factual record on a particular alleged enforcement 
failure, such as an asserted failure to effectively enforce the U.S. Clean Water 
Act against a particular facility regulated under that law, unless a submitter first 
raises this issue as one warranting such treatment and the Secretariat concurs in 
a recommendation to the Council.  Instead, the Council only is empowered to 
order the Secretariat to develop a factual record concerning particular 
enforcement practices and/or policies if a submitter identifies them in a 
submission and if the Secretariat determines that development of a factual 
record concerning them is appropriate and makes a recommendation to that 
effect to the Council. 
In short, . . . [it appears that, under the NAAEC], while the Council retains the 
authority to veto shining the spotlight in particular directions, the Council 
cannot decide on its own where the spotlight should shine.  For that affirmative 
decision, the Council must follow the lead of civil society, as reflected in the 
submissions, and the lead of the independent Secretariat created to administer 
the process in a neutral way.  A Council failure to respect this limit in the 
Agreement on its authority risks serious intrusion into the independent roles that 
the Agreement creates for the Secretariat and submitters. 
Id. at 284. 
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makes it virtually inevitable that a key flashpoint during “regime 
implementation” would involve the boundaries of authority of the 
different actors.87  In creating the process, the Parties agreed to 
serve as the targets of this new international spotlight.  At the 
same time, they reserved considerable authority over its 
operation.88  It seems predictable that the evolution of the spotlight 
would be characterized by Party efforts to narrow its scope and by 
NGO efforts to extend its reach. 
The CEC’s Ten-Year Review and Assessment Committee 
(TRAC) noted that the CEC’s “unique” effort among 
intergovernmental organizations to combine the Secretariat’s 
“traditional service role to the governments that created it” with 
“responsibilities where the Secretariat has certain autonomy... “ 
had led a former CEC executive director to conclude that “the 
independent authority on these issues granted by the Agreement to 
the Secretariat creates a significant natural tension between the 
Secretariat and the Parties.”89  Professor Kal Raustiala similarly 
has suggested that the existence of such tension should not be 
surprising.  Countries do not often embrace “fire alarm” review 
mechanisms such as the CEC citizen submissions process, in 
which they invest authority to review performance in actors they 
cannot control, in part because of concerns about the implications 
for state sovereignty as well as the prospect for embarrassment.90 
Professor Raustiala also explains that in the particular context 
of the NAAEC, the Parties did not embrace a “fire alarm” 
approach because of an abiding desire for an international 
mechanism intended to invigorate domestic enforcement by 
 
 87 NGO participation in international regimes has received considerable attention in 
recent years, as opportunities for NGO involvement have increased.    See e.g., Kal 
Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law, 21 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997). 
 88 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
 89 TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 32. 
 90 See Raustiala, supra note 19, at 259.  Fire alarms permit private actors to trigger 
an investigation much as a private individual can pull a fire alarm to trigger a response 
by the appropriate fire officials.  Id. at 258.  By contrast, a “police patrol”  involves 
investigations by government officials of situations that might warrant government 
response.  Id.  See Raustiala, supra note 9, at 393-94; Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas 
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarm, 28 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
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spotlighting ineffectual domestic enforcement practices or policies 
or due to any sense of conviction that such a strategy would be 
especially effective in encouraging the Parties to enforce their 
environmental laws effectively.91  Instead, they were forced into it 
as the price for treaty enactment because of the power of domestic 
environmental NGOs, particularly in the United States.92  Thus, 
the inclusion of the citizen submissions process does not 
necessarily reflect a significant investment by the Parties in the 
process or a significant Party commitment to its successful 
operation.93
 
The Resolutions are by no means the first Council forays into 
territory that some observers claim is ceded in the Agreement to 
other actors.  Virtually since the inception of the citizen 
submissions process there has been considerable criticism that the 
Council has overplayed its role by limiting the independence and 
authority of the Secretariat, thereby weakening the process.  The 
four CEC-sponsored reviews of the citizen submissions process 
have raised concerns about the Parties’ performances.94  The JPAC 
 
 91 Raustiala, supra note 19, at 260, 262. 
 92 Id. at 262. 
 93 See supra note 46.   The Council frequently has expressed its support for the 
process.    See e.g., Resolution 04-03 (noting that the Council is “supportive of the 
[citizen submissions] process. . . .) 
 94 Two reviews covered the entire CEC operations.   One was commissioned 
concerning the first four years of the CEC’s operation, “Four Year Review,” Independent 
Review Committee, FOUR-YEAR REV. OF THE N. AM. AGREEMENT ON ENVTL. 
COOPERATION (1998).  The NAAEC had directed that the Parties undertake such a 
review.  North American Agreement on Evironmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 
10(1)(b).   In 2003, the CEC Council created a Ten-Year Review and Assessment 
Committee on the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, which submitted its 
report in June 2004.  TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3.  The 
TRAC also concluded that the Secretariat had “contributed to the development of an 
adversarial relationship between the Parties and the Secretariat” through its 
administration of the process, “particularly at the beginning. . . .”  Id. at 45.   But the 
TRAC, curiously, does not cite to any sources to support this conclusion.   Instead, its 
only cite after this statement is to a September 2003 letter to JPAC from the Forest 
Products Association of Canada which argues for limiting the scope of factual records.  
Id. at 45 n.47.  JPAC also has undertaken two reviews of the citizen submissions process.   
It published the results of the first, which it undertook at the request of the Council, in 
2001.  Joint Public Advisory Committee, Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 15 
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (2001); Matters 
Related to Articles 14 and 15 of the Agreement, C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2, June 13, 2000, 
para. 5(a), available at http://www.cec.org./files/pdf/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf; TEN-
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also has expressed concerns about the Council’s conduct in a 
series of “Advices” it has issued to the Secretariat over the years.95  
Other advisory bodies, such as the National Advisory Committees 
(NACs)96 and the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC),97  
which the Parties have established under the Agreement to advise 
them on the implementation of the NAAEC, have also made 
known their discomfort with the Parties’ actions in performing 
their responsibilities under the process.98  Civil society,99 including 
 
YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 44.  JPAC commissioned the 
Environmental Law Institute to prepare a second such report in 2003.  ENVTL. L. INST., 
ISSUES RELATING TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2003).   For more background on the genesis of this 
report, and on the process ELI followed in developing it, see ENVTL. L.  INST., supra note 
6, at v.1. 
 95 See, e.g., JPAC, Advice to Council no. 99-01, Mar. 25, 1999.  The JPAC has 
expressed frustration with the Council’s performance of its responsibilities in connection 
with the citizen submissions process on numerous occasions, raising a variety of 
concerns.  See, e.g., Regina Barba, JPAC Chair, to the Council Members, Mar. 24, 2000; 
Regina Barba, JPAC Chair, to the Council Members, May 2, 2000 (indicating that the 
JPAC is communicating with the Council, “once again,” about “our frustration and 
growing unease with how matters relating to Articles 14 & 15 are being managed”).  
More recent JPAC Advices evince this frustration concerning the Council’s actions 
relating to the specific issues discussed here, among others.  Advice 01-09, for example, 
requested that the Council authorize a public review concerning the “matter of limiting 
the scope of factual records,” among other issues.  JPAC, Advice to Council no. 01-09, 
Nov. 30, 2001.  Additionally, Advice 03-05 “strongly recommends that Council refrain 
in the future from limiting the scope of factual records presented for decision by 
Secretariat.” JPAC, Advice to Council no. 03-05, Dec. 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.cec.org./files/pdf/JPAC/Advice03-05_EN.pdf.  See generally John D. Wirth, 
supra note 22, at 199.  The TRAC, in describing the JPAC’s role, noted that “some 
members have . . . interpreted their role to include ‘keeping Council honest’ and ‘helping 
maintain Secretariat’s independence.’”  TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, 
supra note 3, at 34. 
 96 Article 17 authorizes each Party to create such a body.  North American 
Assessment on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 17. 
 97 Article 18 authorizes each Party to create such a body.  Id. art. 18.  As the TRAC 
reports, only the United States has created a GAC.   TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT 
COMM’N, supra note 3, at 36.  Canada has created an “Intergovernmental Committee,” 
comprised of the federal Environment Minister and the Ministers of the three Canadian 
provinces that have signed on to the NAAEC (Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec).    Id. at 
37. 
 98 See, e.g., TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 36.; see 
also U.S. Governmental Advisory Committee Letter to Christine Todd Whitman (Oct. 
19, 2001) (expressing concern that allowing Parties to define the scope of the factual 
record will eviscerate the Secretariat’s independence and the credibility of the 
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but not limited to the submitter community, also has weighed in 
with considerable criticism of the countries’ performance of their 
respective roles under the citizen submissions process.  Business 
Week reported in May 2000 that during that spring, more than 100 
NGOs from all three countries charged that the governments were 
“working together to undermine” the process.100  A June 10, 2000 
Washington Post editorial entitled “How to Wreck Trade” 
characterized the submission process as “sound[ing] rather 
government-controlled” and continued by criticizing the countries 
for “pushing ideas that might strengthen that bias by allowing 
governments to intervene in the experts’ fact-finding work.”101 
Concerns about the implementation of the citizen submissions 
process continue to exist.102  In its 2004 Report, the TRAC noted 
that “[t]oday, the relationships among the Parties, the Secretariat 
and the JPAC are often strained.”103  The TRAC ascribes some of 
this strain to the Council’s role in the citizen submissions process, 
noting that many have “expressed concern about the Council 
exercising [sic] too much discretion on the administration of 
Articles 14/15 where the Secretariat has specific responsibilities 
under the NAAEC....  This issue has been an important source of 
friction among the Parties, the Secretariat and JPAC and has 
 
submission process); Letter from U.S. NAC to the U.S. Representative to the CEC (May 
15, 2000); NAC Advice no. 2000-2 (expressing concern about, inter alia, Council 
overreaching); Letter from U.S. NAC to U.S. Representatives to the CEC (Apr. 29, 
2002) (characterizing recent actions by the Council as “totally unacceptable and contrary 
to both the spirit and the letter [of the NAAEC]”), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ocempage/nac/pdf/2002_0429_nac_cec.pdf; Letter from U.S. NAC 
to U.S. Representatives to the CEC (Oct. 29, 2003) (“The Council should . . . refrain 
from overruling the Secretariat’s recommendations to ensure that the process remains 
impartial”), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocempage/nac/nac_2003_10_ 
advisoryletter.htm.  The TRAC suggests that the NACs “have forced their respective 
governments to consider issues that they otherwise might not have (e.g., related to 
Articles 14 and 15).” 
 99 See supra note 12, for a discussion of the definition of “civil society.” 
 100 Elizabeth Malkin, Taking the Green out of NAFTA, BUS.W., May 29, 2000. 
 101 Editorial, How to Wreck Trade, WASH. POST, June 10, 2000. 
 102 See e.g., Tollefson, supra note 47, at 180-81; Wold et al., supra note 18. 
 103 TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 30.  The TRAC 
notes that “the Secretariat complains that the Parties are micromanaging its activities and 
inappropriately circumscribing its autonomy (e.g., on Articles 14 and 15).”   Id. 
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colored their relationships.”104 
It appears that the Council’s November 2001 Resolutions have 
contributed significantly to this unease and frustration.105  For 
 
 104 Id. at 32, 45 (indicating that the Parties “believe that the Secretariat has at times 
both extended the process beyond what had been contemplated . . . and overstepped its 
authority. . . ”).  For the most part, the Secretariat has received positive marks.  Id. 
(noting that “Submitters and outside observers by and large believe that the Secretariat 
has performed its obligations well”); cf. Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process 
Under NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement: It’s Easy to Use, But Does It Work?, 26 
ENVTL. L. REP. 1003 (1996). 
An interesting observation concerning the process is contained in a 2001 CSIS/Yale 
report: 
The issue of citizens’ complaints is presented as both a strength and a weakness 
for the CEC.   It is a weakness only in the sense that the ample opportunity that 
the NAAEC provides for citizens to file environmental complaints against their 
governments has proved so contentious in Mexico, and to some extent in 
Canada, that at times it has stalled progress in other areas of environmental 
policymaking for North America. 
In the early years of NAFTA, the Mexican government lacked experience in 
making information on government activities available to the public and the 
country had only a short track record of involving the public in government 
decision-making.   In fact, the first-ever public hearings by a Mexican federal 
environmental entity occurred only in summer 1991, when the Mexican 
environmental agency of that period held hearings jointly with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency on a planned environmental improvement 
program for the U.S.-Mexican border area. 
Many government officials in all three countries agree that this lack of 
experience has created political problems for the CEC’s secretariat, making it 
difficult to implement the transparency and citizens’ participation components 
of NAFTA’s environmental side agreement, particularly the provisions of 
Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC. 
JAN GILBREATH, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: PREDICTING A COURSE FOR THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE USING THE NORTH AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 37-38 (June 2001). 
 105 One question, for example, involves which entity decides whether information 
provided by the submitter is “sufficient” to pass muster under the process.   North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 14 (1)(c); see 
e.g., TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that “[w]hat 
burden of proof a submitter must meet before the Council agrees to the preparation of a 
factual record remains an issue for several observers”).  Part of this issue involves the 
respective roles of the Secretariat and Council in deciding whether the submitter has met 
its burden.   The Ten-Year Review found that “[t]he Parties need to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of the CEC’s three main bodies . . . as they relate to the cooperative 
agenda and the citizens’ submissions process. . . .”   Id. at x.  The charge of the TRAC 
was to “undertake a retrospective of the implementation of the NAAEC over the past ten 
years and . . . provide recommendations to the Council for charting a path for the CEC 
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example, lawyers with SLDF, which has represented submitters 
for several submissions, have stated that “the actions of the 
Council... have dramatically reduced the effectiveness and utility 
of the process.”106  In a letter to the Canadian NAC, the SLDF 
lawyers characterized the Resolutions as a “clear infringement on 
the independence of the Secretariat”  and suggested that they 
“threaten to strip the citizen submission process of its integrity, 
utility and legitimacy.”107  Similarly, the submitter for the U.S. 
submission that was the subject of one of the Council’s November 
2001 Resolutions, the Center for International Environmental Law 
(CIEL), sent a letter to JPAC that characterized the narrowing of 
the factual records as an “attempt to limit the utility of the citizen 
submission process.”108 
 
over the next decade.”   Id. at 1.   The TRAC is the CEC’s second official review.   Id. at 
2. 
 106 Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, supra note 75. 
 107 See also Environmental Policy Alert, EPA Backs Narrow NAFTA Inquiry to 
Resolve Environmental Dispute, supra note 76. 
 108 Letter from CIEL to JPAC, U.S. Position on Migratory Bird Submission (Oct. 
17, 2001), available at http://www.ciel.org/Announce/CEC_JPAC_Letter.html.   The 
TRAC summarizes other submitter criticisms of the Council as follows: “[S]ubmitters 
have also criticized the Parties for not providing information requested by the 
Secretariat, for delaying the process, for pre-empting CEC review by engaging in 
desultory enforcement actions and for not responding to submitters’ letters.” Id.  TEN-
YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 46.  ELI reached the same 
conclusion.   ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v. 
A related question concerns the effect of Council actions on citizens’ interest in the 
process.   For example, on the “scope” issue that was an important focus of concern with 
respect to the Council’s actions regarding the four Resolutions discussed previously, the 
CEC’s special legal advisors noted that Council limiting actions of this sort had the 
potential to undermine the process and thereby diminish citizen interest in it: 
[I]f the scope of factual records continues to be limited to specific alleged 
failures to enforce- e.g., a destroyed nest here or a damaged stream bed there- 
the result is likely to seriously limit the effectiveness of the Article 14-15 
process.   Moreover, such limitations of factual record scope has the potential to 
permanently undermine the integrity of the process to the point where it is of 
limited interest to potential submitters.   Process integrity and credibility are 
critical because it is a public process that relies on and is driven by the 
responses and actions of citizens and NGOs in the three countries. 
TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45. TRAC notes that: 
Some observers have argued . . . that the actions of the Council have eroded the 
credibility of the process and are directly responsible for the fact that no new 
submissions have been brought against the United States Government in the last 
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The experience to date, in short, suggests that the tension that 
might have been anticipated for the process has manifested itself 
as the process has been implemented and that the Council’s 
November 2001 Resolutions have added considerably to the level 
of tension and have significantly raised the level of NGO 
apprehension about the utility of, and prospects for, the process.109 
What are the possible consequences of the Resolutions for the 
vigor and viability of the citizen submissions process?  The 
Resolutions represent another chapter in this ongoing tug and 
pull,110  but there is not yet enough information to forecast the 
conclusion to the citizen submission story with any great degree of 
confidence.  It is not yet clear whether the Resolutions signal an 
invigorated Council initiative to circumscribe the citizen 
spotlight,111 or whether they more accurately should be 
 
four years and that the large environmental NGOs are not using the process. 
Id. at 46.  Even the TRAC itself felt constrained to conclude that “the Council’s 
constraining actions have upset the balance set out in the NAAEC and undermined the 
Secretariat’s roles in ways that could compromise the process’s effectiveness and 
credibility.”  Id.  Further, “[t]he public sees the Parties as neither supporting the citizens’ 
submission process nor the values underlying it.”   Id.   ELI similarly concluded that the 
Resolutions may reduce the use of the process for enforcement concerns involving the 
United States, and to some extent Canada, and instead “tilt the distribution 
overwhelmingly towards submissions against Mexico,” because the former two countries 
have much better domestic processes for handling case-specific enforcement failures.   
ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 12.  ELI’s prognosis: “As a result, the large majority of 
factual records will be about site-specific failures to enforce in Mexico, thus defeating 
the tri-national nature of the Agreement.”   Id. 
 109 TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, at 40 (noting that, 
among other things, the CEC today “has less support than could have been anticipated 
among its major stakeholder groups (NGOs, business, academia) in the United States for 
a variety of reasons. . . .  U.S. NGO dissatisfaction with what they see as the Council 
weakening the citizens’ submission process . . . has contributed to the detachment”).    
TRAC found that, in contrast, “Canadian and Mexican NGOs . . . have valued the 
increased transparency that the citizens’ submissions process has brought to specific 
issues in each of these countries.”  TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra 
note 3, at 40.    It is not clear why the TRAC failed to mention Canadian NGO 
dissatisfaction with the Council’s actions under the Article 14/15 process. 
 110 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at v, 13 (noting that “[m]any commentators 
expressed the view that, by intervening in the fact-finding process, the Council is 
undermining the independence of the Secretariat and the credibility of the process”). 
 111 It is, of course, possible that Council initiatives and predilections will be 
influenced by domestic policy developments.   Jonathan Graubart suggests that the 
current U.S. administration may be less supportive of the process than previous 
administrations, particularly of an independent Secretariat.  Jonathan Graubart, Giving 
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characterized as opportunistic actions of the Council that respond 
to a flurry of Secretariat Recommendations.  Gauging the extent 
and efficacy of civil society’s response to the Council’s actions 
similarly must await future developments.112  Since the inception 
of the process, NGOs have given considerable support to it as a 
highly innovative feature of international law that has the potential 
to enhance domestic governance and accountability.113  In recent 
years, several NGO participants, among others, have begun to 
offer anecdotal evidence that the process is producing dividends 
by triggering improvements in domestic environmental 
governance.114  Thus, there appears to be some level of NGO 
 
Meaning to New Trade-Linked ‘Soft Law’ Agreements on Social Values: A Law-in-
Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 425, 460 (2001-2002).  This could be significant, since the United States 
long has been considered the primary defender of the process among the parties.  See 
Wirth, supra note 22, at 199.  On the other hand, some commentators suggest that the 
current Mexican administration is more favorably disposed to support the process than 
its predecessor.  Graubart, supra at 460. 
 112 ELI concluded from its study that citizen confidence in the process is tied closely 
to the independence of the Secretariat, and that Council actions of the sort represented by 
the Resolutions might undermine such confidence: 
Interviews with submitters, academic experts, and others have consistently 
revealed that the credibility of the citizens’ submissions process stems from the 
independence of the Secretariat.   There is widespread concern that allowing the 
Council to set the terms of the Secretariat’s fact-finding process will undercut 
this independence.    [I]t is . . . as effective as “the fox guarding the chicken 
coop.” 
ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 13. 
On the other hand,  see Markell, supra note 8 (noting that a group of submitters has filed 
a similarly broad-based submission concerning mercury emissions from coal-fired power 
plants in the United States).   Further, the Council has authorized preparation of a broad 
Factual Record in connection with the Ontario Logging submission.   See supra Part III. 
 113 Wold et al., supra note 18, at 416.  There also have been claims that the citizen 
submissions process was not likely to have much effect because of its lack of sanctioning 
authority, among other perceived weaknesses in the mechanism, and there have been 
criticisms of its performance and impacts.  See, e.g., JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 2, 
at 34; Kibel, supra note 47, at 474-77; John Kirton, The Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation and Canada-U.S. Environmental Governance in the NAFTA Era, 27 AM. 
REV. CANADIAN STUD. 459 (1997); Tutchton, supra note 104, at 1003. 
 114 A real need for systematic research in this area exists, and the JPAC, among 
others, has called for incorporating follow-up as a part of the citizen submissions 
process.  See Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and 15 of the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 16 (2001); Markell, supra 
note 17, at 545.  Providing a positive gloss is a June 2001 study, GILBREATH, supra note 
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investment in and commitment to the process, which makes it 
more likely that NGOs will seek through various strategies to 
reform the process rather than rush to abandon it as a result of the 
Council Resolutions.115  JPAC’s numerous Advices to the Council 
 
104, at 5, 12, 14, 34.  At an anecdotal level, evidence is mounting that the process is 
adding value in a variety of ways.  The process appears to be yielding considerable 
information on domestic enforcement practices that might not be developed otherwise.  
Further, even for information that already exists, the process is serving as a mechanism 
that facilitates organizing this information in a way that is more responsive to citizens’ 
interests.  In addition, there is some evidence that the process has been at least a partial 
contributor to more “environmentally-protective” behavior on the part of governments.  
See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 11 (noting that “in spite of the narrowed 
scope, the factual records examined in this report have proved valuable to a certain 
extent” by, inter alia, (1) likely prompting enforcement efforts “in the particular cases 
investigated;” (2) “spotlight[ing] problems and generat[ing] negative publicity in the 
context of specific cases, sometimes leading the government to address the broader 
enforcement concerns giving rise to the specific cases;” (3) “generat[ing] information 
about government policies raised in the context of a specific case that may be useful to 
submitters in assessing or bringing other cases;” and (4) “put[ting] the public on notice 
of the broader enforcement problems alleged by the submitters”).  ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT ON NORTH AMERICA’S BORDERS 252 (Richard Kiy & John D. Wirth eds., 
1998); Kibel, supra note 47, at 469-70; Paul Kibel, Awkward Evolution: Citizen 
Enforcement at the North American Environmental Commission, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10769, 10774, 10775 (2002); Geoff Garver, Factual Record Helped in Cozumel Pier 
Case, Says Submitter, TRIO Newsletter of the NAAEC (Summer 2001), available at 
http://www.cec.org/trio/ 
stories/index.cfm?varlan=english&ed=4&ID=50; Jamie Bowman, Citizen Submission 
Process Proves Valuable in BC Hydro Case, TRIO Newsletter of the NAAEC (Fall 
2001), available at http://www.cec.org/trio/stories/index.cfm?ed=5&ID=70&varlan 
=english. 
 115 As an example, any number of possible mechanisms potentially could be 
developed for addressing disagreements between the Council and the Secretariat about 
the appropriate scope of factual records or ambiguities in Secretariat Recommendations.  
One option is that the Council simply must approve or reject a Secretariat 
recommendation.  See ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 14 (suggesting this as a possible 
option).   A second would be for the Council to “remand” a recommendation for further 
explanation if the Council is not persuaded that a factual record is warranted, at least on 
the terms provided in the recommendation.  Guideline 10.1 already provides authority 
for the Council to make such a request.  Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement 
Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, Council Res. 99-06, at No. 10.1.  For either approach, one issue involves 
the appropriate standard for the Council’s review of the Secretariat’s recommendations.   
See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 6, at 15, n.117. (indicating that one commentator 
recommends the Council use an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, while another 
suggests a “patently unreasonable” standard).    Finally, the Secretariat unilaterally could 
seek to address some of the issues discussed in the text by proactively specifying in 
considerable detail in its recommendations the types of factual records it believes are 
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expressing dissatisfaction with the Council’s actions,116 and 
submitters’ continued submission of comments concerning the 
process,117 suggest at least some level of ongoing engagement.118  
The post-November 2001 filing of several “pattern-based” 
submissions, including one involving the United States, is 
additional evidence of at least some level of continued “buy-in” by 
the NGO community. 
Assuming civil society is sufficiently invested to challenge the 
Council in situations in which it potentially reduces the value of 
the citizen submissions process through actions such as the 
November 2001 Resolutions, the “efficacy question” remains, 
notably the extent to which civil society will have sufficient 
leverage to influence the Parties.  As Professor Raustiala has 
pointed out, NGO leverage likely was greater prior to the adoption 
of NAFTA than it is now, at the implementation stage.119  Thus, an 
outstanding question involves the extent to which an engaged civil 
society has the leverage to forestall Party actions that potentially 
operate to curtail the citizen submissions process.120 
Optimists and pessimists alike can find support in the CEC’s 
experience for their views about the likely prospects for the citizen 
submissions process.  On the pessimist’s side, JPAC, among 
others, suggests the Council’s actions have produced a loss of 
credibility for the process.  JPAC has urged the Council to “re-
establish public confidence” in the citizen submissions process,121 
including by making “every effort to ensure that the independence 
of the Secretariat is maintained.”122  There also is the dramatic lack 
 
warranted in connection with particular submissions, and the types that are not.    Fuller 
treatment and consideration of such mechanisms is warranted. 
 116 See, e.g., JPAC, Advice to Counsel, Nov. 30, 2001, supra note 95. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. (concerning the recent filing of a submission that asserts a widespread failure 
to effectively enforce in the United States).    See also supra note 112. 
 119 See Raustiala, supra note 19. 
 120 The Council’s Resolution authorizing the Secretariat to develop a broad-based 
Factual Record for the Ontario Logging submission might be considered a signal for 
optimists.  Pessimists might point to Council concerns about “sufficiency of 
information” as a predicate for development of Factual Records.    See, e.g., Wold et al., 
supra note 18; Letter from Randy Christensen & Jerry DeMarco, supra note 75. 
 121 Advice 04-03. 
 122 Advice 04-03. 
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of proportion in submissions, with very few submissions involving 
the U.S. having been filed in recent years.123  Finally, there are 
institutional challenges or impediments to effectiveness, such as 
the lack of institutionalized follow-up on the information 
concerning ineffectual enforcement developed as part of the CEC 
process.124  These apparent deficiencies in regime design as well as 
the empirical record of implementation should give pause to 
analysts predisposed to sing the praises of the process. 
Nevertheless, there is support in the CEC’s track record for the 
optimist as well.  Submitters have continued to use the citizen 
submissions process.  The trend in submissions has been stable 
over the past several years.  Further, after a several year hiatus, a 
new submission has been filed concerning the United States, thus 
suggesting at least some ongoing level of interest in exploring the 
possible value of the process for focusing attention on domestic 
enforcement practices and policies in this country.  Second, while 
there is no institutionalized follow-up process, much of the 
anecdotal feedback on the process has been quite positive.  Thus, 
many of the submitters who have used the process appear to 
believe that it has helped to engender important changes in 
government enforcement behavior.  Finally, there is some 
evidence that the Council is somewhat responsive to citizen 
concerns.  Since the issuance of its November 2001 Resolutions, 
the Council has authorized other factual records that are broad in 
scope.  Further, in its June 3, 2004 letter to JPAC, the Council 
expressly “[drew] to JPAC’s attention Council decisions that 
provide for broad reviews of enforcement activities.”125  The 
Council indicated its view that the resulting factual records “will 
undoubtedly provide the public and Parties with a comprehensive 
recounting of how enforcement policies are implemented in 
practice within a sector and across large geographic areas.”126  
Even the skeptic seemingly would concede that letters of this sort 
reflect some degree of effort by the Parties to be responsive to the 
 
 123 See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Three 
Countries Working Together to Protect Our Shared Environment, at http://www.cec.org. 
 124 See supra note 114. 
 125  Letter from Jose Manual Bulas Montroo, Alternate Representative for Mexico, 
to Ms. Donna Tingley, JPAC Chair for 2004 (June 3, 2004). 
 126  Id. 
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concerns that civil society has raised concerning administration of 
the citizen submissions process. 
In short, it is too early to tell whether the Resolutions represent 
a temporary bump in the road in the emergence of a vibrant citizen 
submissions process or a more significant derailment – whether 
NGO pressure and interest, creative approaches, and the 
responsive instincts of government officials will produce a 
convergence of views about the appropriate parameters for the 
process that will enable it to find a place of rough equilibrium, or 
whether the process will implode either because of Party 
discomfort or NGO frustration.127  Because the process is an 
experiment in regional governance128 and has the potential to 
 
 127 The June 2004 TRAC report reflects the ongoing tension: 
After ten years, the main CEC stakeholders, including the Parties, the 
Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory committee (JPAC), have not been able 
to develop a common vision about the CEC mandate or their respective roles.   
These differences have led to considerable friction.  The NAAEC’s most 
innovative public participation mechanism, the citizens’ submission process, 
has become mired in controversy. 
Id. at 5. 
The TRAC, along the same lines, notes that the citizen submissions process has 
“dominated” the CEC agenda, and “strained relations among the Council, JPAC, and the 
Secretariat. . . .”   Id. at 43.   The TRAC found that “[a]t the root of the controversy have 
been the strikingly different expectations that citizens and the governments have about 
the process.”   Its “advocates” have described the process as “[a] unique and 
indispensable role in fostering vigorous environmental enforcement” and as the 
NAAEC’s “centerpiece,” while government officials have “sought to circumscribe” the 
process for a variety of reasons.   TEN-YEAR REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 3, 
at 43.  The process could founder because of other concerns as well.   For example, the 
TRAC noted that the process “has proven more burdensome” than had been “initially 
anticipated,” and that the process is “relatively inflexible. . . .”   Id. 
TRAC noted the importance of this issue to the future of the CEC, noting that, 
[T]he heart of the CEC is its institutions – the Council of Ministers, the 
Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee. . . .   [T]he lack of clarity 
as to their respective roles and accountabilities has become increasingly evident. 
. . .   Concerted action is needed to bring greater clarity to these roles in order to 
ensure efficient and effective governance of the CEC. 
Id. at 52. 
 128 In part because of the process, which TRAC describes as an “unprecedented 
commitment by the three governments to account internationally for the enforcement of 
their environmental laws,” TRAC characterized the CEC as an “international model.”   
Id. at ix.    It is not the first reviewer to do so.   See, e.g., Wold et al., supra note 18, at 
416 (“Many had regarded the Citizen Submission Process as a potential model for 
2005] GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 793 
 
influence domestic policy choices, the answer to these questions 
holds considerable interest for those interested in environmental 
governance issues in North America and beyond.129 
 
accountability and governance for a new breed of international institutions . . . ”). 
(citations omitted). 
 129 A coalition of environmental groups (the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, and others) has developed a document entitled Principles for 
Environmentally Responsible Trade that urges policymakers to “provide a mechanism 
for citizens to seek review of failures to enforce health and environmental laws.” It is 
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/letter.asp.   TRAC reports that 
“[a]necdotal evidence indicates that the process has helped protect environmental 
quality,” and it points to several examples of positive impacts of the process, though it 
notes that lack of mandatory follow-up to factual records means that benefits have not 
been documented systematically.  TEN-YEAR REV. AND ASSESSMENT COMM’N, supra note 
3, at 46. 
Four of the many issues for which the CEC experience may provide insights include: (1) 
the extent to which Parties are inclined to be “conservative” in applying or interpreting 
commitments made in international agreements; (2) the extent to which international 
bureaucracies will be inclined to try to expand their turf over time; (3) how these 
tendencies, if they exist, are likely to co-exist; and (4) the extent to which NGOs should 
focus on “regime-building” versus implementation.   For background sources on some of 
these issues, see, e.g., David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in THE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-2 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998) (noting 
that although “most analysts focus on . . . [treaty] formulation, negotiation, and context[,] 
. . . it is not legislation alone, but rather the implementation process that determines 
whether a commitment has any practical influence”) (citations omitted); Raustiala, supra 
note 19, at 570 (1997) (noting that the use of NGOs will vary depending on whether the 
treaty process is in the negotiation or implementation stage). 
794 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 30 
 
 
